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Knowing through dance-making: 





What does choreography have to do with knowledge? Clearly, choreographic works and the 
processes historically or typically involved in making them are the sorts of things we can 
know something about. But does the practice of choreography itself exploit, develop or 
demonstrate particular kinds of knowledge? Is it a way – or series of ways – of knowing in its 
own right?  
 
The relationship between knowledge and dance practice has been explored by philosophers 
interested in dance and its role in primary, secondary and tertiary education. Writers such as 
Best (1985, 1987a, 1987b), McFee (1992, 1994), Carr (1984, 1987a, 1999) and Redfern 
(1982, 1983) are keen to assert the legitimacy and value of dance within educational 
curricula, and therefore emphasise how the practice of performance and choreography 
contribute to the pupil’s understanding of the art form in general. They also (particularly 
Best and McFee) make a case for dance playing a role in emotional education – in 
developing students’ understanding of life issues through the refined insight which 
engagement with dance works promotes. Much of this writing highlights the cognitive 
processes involved in making, performing and watching dance – clarifying the contribution 
dance can make to cognitive development. A clear connection between choreography and 
particular kinds or domains of knowledge is thus revealed.  
 
More recently, debates about practice as research have again rendered urgent questions 
about choreography’s epistemology.1 If research (at least at higher degree level and beyond) 
is the generation of new knowledge, then treating dance practice as a form of research 
raises important epistemological issues. What kind of knowledge do choreography and 
performance generate? Is this knowledge specifically about the practice of dance, or also 
other domains? How does dance practice develop original insight, and how is this 
disseminated and shared? Unless we can identify the choreographer-researcher’s claim to 
knowledge, it remains difficult to maintain that choreographic research has equivalent 
status with other, more traditional forms of scholarly enquiry. Within the broader university 
environment, the value of choreographic research also seems (at least partly) to hinge on 
whether it generates a distinctive form of knowledge, one that is not available by other 
means.  
 
Western philosophy has traditionally conceived of knowledge as essentially ‘justified true 
belief ’. This conception can be traced back at least as far as Plato’s Theaetetus and 
emphasises the importance of factual and theoretical knowledge over and above other 
forms. It is a conception of what it is to know which has intensified its hold with the 
ascendancy of positivist and scientistic forms of understanding in the modern world. One 
result is a contemporary situation in which ways of knowing that refuse or transcend the 
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scientistic paradigm must often nonetheless be justified with reference to it, if they are to be 
recognised as valid. And against an epistemological framework in which factual and 
theoretical knowledge are accorded pride of place, practice as research is likely to be 
considered at best marginal, at worst illegitimate, as a form of scholarly endeavour (hence 
the scepticism with which dance practice as research is sometimes greeted by academics 
from other disciplines). Choreography is not (generally) a fact-seeking exercise, not 
(necessarily) a theory-building enterprise and rarely (if ever) a means to measure or quantify 
the objects of a supposedly mind-independent reality. So, what do and can we know 
through making dance?  
 
One potentially useful route to an answer is mapped by philosophical discussions of practical 
knowledge. David Carr (1978, 1999) has explored these discussions’ pertinence to the dance 
domain, examining generally how dance practice involves practical reasoning and wisdom. 
The discussion below is indebted to Carr’s work and develops in more detail how the 






A well-known challenge to the factual and theoretical bias of Western epistemology is 
articulated in Gilbert Ryle’s (1963) discussion of knowing how as distinct from knowing that. 
Against the background of a tradition preoccupied with ‘investigating the nature, source, 
and the credentials of the theories we adopt’ (1963: 28), Ryle’s concern is to explore what it 
is to know how to perform tasks and what it means to act intelligently. His ideas are 
pertinent to choreography insofar as they outline a kind of knowledge embodied in dance, 
alongside other forms of practice.  
 
The distinction between ‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing that’ can be illustrated using a simple 
example. Knowing how to ride a bicycle is clearly different from a theoretical knowledge of 
how the bicycle works, or of how the expenditure of human energy while pedalling results in 
forward motion. Factual and theoretical knowledge of the latter kind are not going to help 
the aspiring cyclist learn to ride – that can only be achieved through practice. Similarly, 
knowledge of how to make a dance work is distinct from being able to analyse existing 
choreography or explain how and why it is effective. By extension of Ryle’s argument, the 
experienced artist’s knowledge how would be embodied in her conduct of the creative 
process: it informs the way the choreographer relates to her dancers, generates movement 
material, manipulates and edits that material and orchestrates the variety of choreographic 
elements within the emerging work. It is not a case of having a prior theoretical knowledge 
of what should be done in a choreographic situation and then putting these ideas into 
practice; nor is it a question of envisaging the work in theory and then finding a physical 
form to illustrate that idea. Rather, the intelligence of the choreographer’s action is 
embedded in the doing, of which she may or may not be reflectively aware. And this 
knowledge how is something that – like riding a bike – can only be developed through 
practice. It cannot be learned by rote or in the abstract.  
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For Ryle, then, knowing how is a legitimate form of knowledge in its own right, not a 
derivative operation premised on prior theoretical under- standing. Thought and knowledge 
are embodied in the activity of those who know how. That intelligent action is not – as is 
often assumed – a two- stage process of thinking, then acting in accordance with the 
thoughts. With the skilful clown, the chess master, the experienced player of darts (and, by 
extension, the experienced dance artist), we admire what they do, not ‘some extra hidden 
performance executed “in their head[s]”’ (1963: 33). Ryle’s claims about ‘knowing how’ form 
part of his broader challenge to dualist assumptions and to the paradigm of the ‘ghost in the 
machine’. His ultimate purpose is to show the absurdity of positing mind and body, thought 
processes and physical action as separate, logically parallel entities. Dualism, for Ryle, rests 
on this fundamental category mistake. The ‘intellectualist legend’, which imagines intelligent 
practice as ‘a step-child of theory’ (1963: 27), previously formulated in the abstract and 
private space of the agent’s mind, succumbs to the same fallacy.  
 
Ryle’s argument seems highly suggestive for the dance artist because it accords weight and 
value to the doing itself, instead of requiring a theorisation of practice to render it 
epistemologically respectable. Understanding is already embodied in actions the artist 
performs during the making process: there is no need to alter the nature of that process in 
order to give it credence as thoughtful activity. Ryle’s view also chimes in tune with the 
claims of those choreographer-researchers who object to the idea that their practice must 
be informed, even directed, by a theoretical perspective or agenda in order to qualify as 
research. To assume that theory must be the driving force behind thoughtful choreography 
would be to succumb to what Ryle calls the ‘intellectualist fallacy’ and to ignore the 





Ryle’s discussion thus resonates in the sphere of dance practice, but remains too schematic 
to probe the nature and parameters of knowing how. David Carr (1978) recognises and 
proposes to redress this by drawing on the writings of post-war analytic philosophers about 
practical inference (Anscombe 1963, Kenny 1966 and Von Wright 1963, 1971). These 
writings in turn refer back to Aristotle’s exploration of forms of practical knowledge (2000), 
and to his ‘invention’ of the practical syllogism, which attempts to formalise the kind of 
reasoning typical of the sphere of practical action. Because this literature further elucidates 
the logic of knowing how, it arguably identifies principles of rationality embedded in dance 
practice, and may help clarify what constitutes choreographic knowing.  
 
The mainstay of logical enquiry before Gottlob Frege, the syllogism, depends for its validity 
on certain rules that govern inference from premises to conclusion, a classic example being 
the following:  
 
All men are mortal   Premise 1  
Socrates is a man   Premise 2  
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Therefore, Socrates is mortal  Conclusion  
 
In this example, the first premise states a universal law, the second an empirical fact, which 
falls under the province of that universal law, allowing the valid inference to another fact 
which is articulated in the conclusion. This pattern of passing from general premise to 
singular premise to singular conclusion is the ‘canonical syllogistic form’ (Carr 1978: 7). The 
syllogism presents a proof of the conclusion which follows necessarily from the premises, if 
the rules of logic are obeyed. This is a kind of reasoning about matters of fact and general 
principles, governed by a logic of truth and falsity: if the premises are true, then the 
conclusion will also be true. This kind of deductive inference plays a key role in scientific 
reasoning or explanation, though it is not the only form of reasoning present in that 
domain.2  
 
The practical syllogism, meanwhile, articulates a different kind of logic, whereby one moves 
from intentions or purposes and consideration of the particular circumstances in play (the 
premises) to action (the conclusion), as in the following example from Carr:  
 
I intend to change the oil in my car;  
If I remove the drain plug, I’ll be able to change the oil;  
There is no way to change the oil without removing the drain plug;  
I will/must remove the drain plug. (Carr 1978: 6)  
 
In contrast to theoretical reasoning, this kind of logic is concerned with how we can fulfil our 
intentions rather than with moving from observations to statements about the world. 
Practical inference concerns ‘the practical logic of our efforts to cope with and be effective 
in the world, not the theoretical logic of our thoughts about the world’ (Carr 1978: 8). It 
takes into account the particularity of the situations in which action occurs. Where the first 
premise of a theoretical syllogism is invariably general (e.g. ‘All men are mortal’), ‘there is no 
general positive rule of the form “Always do X” or “Doing X is always good” (where X 
describes some specific action) which a sane person will accept as a starting point for 
reasoning out what to do in a particular case’ (Anscombe 1963: 62). Aristotle and his 
modern followers stress that the conclusion to a practical syllogism is not a statement 
(though it appears as such in attempts to articulate the logical principles at stake) but an 
action. Thus, in the example above, the conclusion would be the actual removal of the drain 
plug not the thought that this would be a good idea, nor simply an intention to remove the 
drain plug (Carr 1978: 8–9). The conclusion ‘is an action whose point is shewn by the 
premises’ (Anscombe 1963: 60). The logical rules of theoretical inference ensure that one 
does not pass from true assertions to false conclusions; the rules of practical inference 
determine ‘that in reasoning about what to do we never pass from a plan which will satisfy 
our desires to a plan which will not satisfy them’ (Kenny 1966: 73). In this ‘logic of 
satisfactoriness’, the motivating desire is crucial as the touchstone against which action is 
measured.  
 
Clearly choreographic making is typically a more complex, less predictable activity than 
changing the oil in one’s car. But the choreographer’s process entails a similar sort of 
 5 
practical engagement over and above any effort to theorise about dance works. It remains a 
question of acting in accordance with an intention, in a way that takes into account the 
prevailing circumstances, be they the precedents set by dance history, contemporary 
aesthetic conventions, or pragmatic considerations (like the available funds, dancers and 
rehearsal space). So the reasoning embedded in choreographic practice seems articulable in 
practical rather than theoretical syllogistic form. There are no general artistic rules to dictate 
what should always be done in particular choreographic situations; rather, the artistic 
intention is the starting point of the chain of reasoning. Relating that intention to the 
surrounding circumstances provides a justification or rationale for what choreographers do 
or the work they make (the syllogism’s conclusion).  
 
It is perhaps instructive to think of choreographers’ verbal (spoken or written) accounts of 
their processes as articulating their rationality in this way. What such accounts often do is to 
show the sense of the artist’s action, that is, they expose the logic embedded in what was 
done, which the choreographer may or may not have been reflectively aware of during the 
process itself.3 Indeed, that logic arguably only becomes evident afterwards, when the work 
is complete and its connections with the original intention can be made. From this 
perspective, accounts of process are not so much causal explanations which trace 
chronologically what went on in the choreographer’s head and the actions it provoked. 
Rather, they are teleological explanations which justify the activity in relation to its end. 
They lay bare the practical reasoning embedded in the choreographic process.  
 
There is an issue here of how we can be sure that practical reasoning informs what the artist 
does unless that logic is somehow made explicit. After all, as Ryle points out, ‘there need be 
no visible or audible differences between an action done with skill and one done from sheer 
habit, blind impulse, or in a fit of absence of mind’ (1963: 40). It is possible, if unlikely, that a 
successful choreographic work could be created by someone wholly inexperienced in the 
practice, because he just happens to hit on an idea, set of images or movement material 
that ‘works’; he does not know how in the manner of the choreographer with thirty years’ 
practice behind her, yet by happy accident produces a dance that gives the illusion that he 
does. But then being able to do is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of knowing 
how, since our inexperienced artist can choreograph without knowing how. Does this 
suggest that the artist’s practical reasoning process must be formalised or symbolically 
articulated in a language other than that of the artwork in order to prove that it informed 
the action?  
 
Requiring verbal articulation of the reasoning process seems to undercut the advances made 
by the notion of practical inference in the first place. It is one thing to say that such 
reasoning can be abstracted and formalised, another to argue that it must: the sense in 
which reasoning is embodied in the doing gets lost as soon as there is an expectation that it 
be reframed or articulated some other way. In their account of the practical syllogism, 
summarised above, both Anscombe and Carr emphasise how its conclusion is an action, not 
a statement of intention or a direction to act, both of which would suggest that a different, 
more theoretical kind of rationality is at stake. Equally, the choreographer might claim that – 
while she may choose to discuss her process and thus lay bare how it was informed by 
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patterns of practical reason – such discussion does not alter the fact that her actions were 
reasonable and intelligent, embodying her knowledge how, regardless of whether or how 
what she did is subsequently described or paraphrased. Similarly, the practitioner-
researcher might be uneasy that the requirement for a verbal account of his process, which 
exposes its reasoned character, shifts the focus of any assessment of his work from the 
practice itself to how well he writes about it even though it is the choreography he has made 
which really embodied his (practical) thinking and knowledge.4  
 
One way around this problem might be to suggest that it is not so much the agent who 
should identify her reasoning process but rather those observing and evaluating what she 
does. Carr (1978) makes the point that we reason practically in the third person and past 
tense as well as in the first person and present tense. Practical reasoning is the means by 
which others’ intentional actions are understood, ‘a matter of perceiving the logical ties 
between their beliefs and intentions and the things that they do’ (1978: 11). If we are to 
claim that a person has knowledge how, we need to be able to explain these logical 
connections implicit in their activity: ‘the correct ascription of “knowing how” presupposes 
understanding of an agent’s behaviour through practical reasoning’ (1978: 14). An example 
of Ryle’s (1963) may help to illustrate this point. Ryle imagines a chess game in which a 
drunkard novice makes a devastating move that flummoxes and, ultimately, defeats his 
more experienced opponent. However, the fact that the drunkard has proved able to do 
this, indeed has performed the move, does not mean that the spectators ascribe to him the 
quality of knowing how to play, or assume that his action was a planned move that had been 
carefully thought through. In fact:  
 
the spectators are satisfied that this was due not to cleverness but to 
luck, if they are satisfied that most of his moves made in this state break 
the rules of chess, or have no tactical connexion with the position of the 
game, that he would not be likely to repeat this move if the tactical 
situation were to recur, that he would not applaud such a move made by 
another player in a similar situation, that he could not explain why he 
had done it or even describe the threat under which his King had been. 
(Ryle 1963: 45)  
 
This description highlights the many and various criteria against which spectators assess 
whether or not the move was intelligent.  
 
A similarly complex, multifaceted set of considerations comes into play when judging a 
dance work as the outcome of a reasoned process. The audience or assessors will be 
interested in how different facets of the work relate to one another, to other instances of 
the choreographer’s practice and, indeed, to works and strategies employed by others in the 
field. They will be concerned with whether the line a choreographer pursues at a particular 
moment (in the dance work, or more generally in her career) makes sense in relation to the 
surrounding circumstances – aesthetic, semantic, pragmatic – and in how the choreographer 
explains (or might explain) that action and/or the problematic it resolved (without requiring 
that the whole logic of her process be laid bare).5 Evaluating practice in this way does not 
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make the success of the action’s outcome a condition of its intelligence. The experienced 
chess player may lose the game as a result of the drunkard’s devastating move, but the 
spectators still recognise that he is the one who really knows how to play. Equally, the dance 
work performed as the culmination of the choreographer’s process might be judged an 
artistic or aesthetic failure, but this would not necessarily disqualify the choreography – or 
the practice-as-research – as intelligent action.  
 
 
Choreography as creative action  
 
There is still, however, a major difficulty in adapting these ideas about practical knowledge 
to choreography and choreography presented as research. Carr, Anscombe and Kenny all 
treat practical reasoning as underwriting intentional action as such. Choreographic practice 
is clearly a form of intentional action – that is, it is not something we engage in by accident, 
or unwittingly (which is not to say that accidents and unexpected turns do not occur in the 
course of making); but it is also a highly specialised and distinctive activity which seems, 
intuitively, to be fundamentally unlike changing the oil in one’s car or playing chess. These 
are much more clearly routinised actions, governed by norms or rules that make the 
reasoning about the means to achieve one’s purposes relatively straightforward.  
 
In one sense, of course, choreography is also a rule-governed activity: conventions do exist 
to render it both possible and identifiable, and even when breaking with these conventions 
one still operates with reference to them.6 And yet, choreography’s creative dimension 
transcends the norm-based character of the ‘ordinary’ activities with which the literature on 
practical inference is largely preoccupied. Ends and means are not as clearly defined in a 
creative situation. For one thing, the purpose or intention governing a choreographic 
process (and thus governing the logic of practical reasoning embedded in that process) may 
itself shift according to the circumstances that present themselves; it may also be discovered 
during that process rather than being identifiable in advance.7 What is more, the 
requirement that practice at least aims at an original approach remains entrenched in the 
aesthetic-artistic environment in which most choreographers work. As soon as we begin to 
consider choreography as research there is an additional expectation that it generate new 
knowledge and make an innovative contribution to the field, not necessarily only with 
respect to its artistic originality.8 Can the practical reasoning model accommodate this 
creative dimension of choreographic (research) practice?  
 
Carr, although concerned with dance education rather than dance research, recognises this 
problem within his early work on dance practical knowledge. He notes that ideas about 
practical inference seem able to account only for ‘the acquisition of fairly routine or habitual 
techniques – staying well clear of the less predictable creative and imaginative aspects of 
dance practice’ (1999: 126). His solution to the dilemma is to further interrogate the range 
of Aristotle’s distinctions between kinds of knowledge, focusing in particular on the notion 
of phronesis (practical wisdom). This notion is also interesting as a way of articulating the 
knowledge a choreographer or choreographer-researcher develops through her practice.  
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For Aristotle, practical knowledge is distinct from theoretical under- standing (episteme), 
which is a demonstrable and teachable form of knowledge concerned with the first 
principles or causes of its objects. Thus episteme is objective knowledge in the traditional 
sense, linked to and demonstrated by the ability to ‘give an account of the thing which 
traced it back, or tied it down, to certain principles (archai) or causes (aitai)’ (Dunne 1997: 
237–8) – the general laws of scientific understanding. The domain of episteme is thus the 
domain of things that cannot be otherwise – of natural laws that transcend human 
intervention in the world. In contemporary terms, a neuroscientific account of a 
choreographer’s brain processes might provide this kind of theoretical explanation of 
practice. The domain of practical knowledge itself, meanwhile, ‘lies forever outside the 
scope of theory’; it is a realm of ‘contingent or variable being … and more specifically, those 
things which, subject to certain limitations, are within the rational power of human beings to 
change’ (Dunne 1997: 243).9  
 
Aristotle also draws a distinction between two modes of practical knowledge, each 
associated with a different form of activity. Techne, or the skill of craftsmanship, is 
associated with making products (poiesis) through the interaction of the craftsman’s skill 
with his materials, the product’s evolving form and its ultimate outcome. This is a reasoned 
capacity to make, linked to theoretical understanding: the craftsman’s techne is evident not 
just in the successful outcome of the making process, but in his capacity ‘to give a rational 
account (logos) of his procedures – an account which is rational insofar as it can trace the 
product back to the causes to which it owes its being (Dunne 1997: 250). It implies a 
detachment of the maker from his product, in Dunne’s words, he can ‘stand outside of his 
materials and allow the productive process to be shaped by the impersonal form which he 
has objectively conceived’ (1997: 263).  
 
In Aristotle’s world, art-making was (or was considered to be) essentially this kind of 
technical procedure, a species of craftsmanship in which skill was used instrumentally to 
achieve pre-conceived ends. In the context of contemporary choreography, techne is still 
involved in making processes where the end is clearly specified in advance – perhaps where 
a dance is created according to an exact specification, or within a well-defined style which 
already sets out the criteria for artistic or aesthetic success. Indeed, an element of techne 
may be present in all choreographic making, insofar as there are parts of the process where 
the aim is clear and a largely procedural approach is appropriate to fulfilling it. For example, 
a transition may need to be found between two distinct, already choreographed sections of 
a work, which gets the dancers from A to B in a manner which blends the movement motifs 
of the two parts. Or lighting may need to be designed which emphasises those elements of 
the movement that the choreographer has already highlighted as important (which is not to 
say that, in other cases, lighting design is not a less routine, more creative process). In these 
cases, the choreographer-craftsman works self-consciously within preconceived parameters 
to achieve an identified aim.  
 
But Aristotle contrasts techne with a different mode of practical knowledge – phronesis or 
practical wisdom – which neither masters nor instrumentalises in this way. This is the 
knowledge associated with the domain of praxis, the variable and mutable world of human 
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beings, intersubjective action and encounters; for Aristotle, the moral domain in which, as 
human beings, we try to live and act in ways beneficial to ourselves and the social group 
(polis). The kind of knowledge needed in this domain is not a technical understanding of how 
to manipulate processes, so much as a creative sensitivity to circumstances as they present 
themselves. Phronesis is not concerned so much with general principles, universal laws or 
causal understanding, but rather with what cannot be generalized. It is a kind of attunement 
to the particularities of situations and experiences, requiring subjective involvement rather 
than objective detachment; and it has an irreducibly personal dimension in its dependence 
upon, and the fact that it folds back into, subjective and intersubjective experience.  
 
Although Aristotle’s own analysis of phronesis applies to the task of cultivating moral virtue, 
Carr (1999) argues its relevance for contemporary artistic practice. In art-making, as in 
ethics, there is a focus on practice rather than theory and on the experientially particular 
rather than universal precepts or generalisations. It is what is done in particular situations 
that matters, and that is shaped by the nature of the particular situation, not by abstract 
reasoning about how things ought to happen. It seems rare that a dance be made in 
accordance with a theory defined in advance, according to generalised rules, or at least, 
choreography of this kind often lacks the interest of work made through a more aleatory, 
creative approach. Carr also points out that both moral and creative artistic action are 
intertwined with the expression and articulation of feeling, requiring sensitivity to the 
emotional character of situations, not detachment or neutrality. And it seems true that, 
even the choreographer who does not set out to make a dance which expresses a particular 
feeling or range of emotions still works with the emotional nuances of movement, light and 
sound, insofar as she is interested in the impact her work may have on a potential audience. 
Carr suggests that for the agent cultivating moral virtue or making dance, there is a 
comparable concern with personal development: in each case, the self is implicated, 
unfolded and cultivated, not something to be set aside in cool objectivism. There are, of 
course, exceptions to this in the world of choreography,10 but in general it seems clear that 
making dance involves the artist as a person much more than, say, theoretical or scientific 
enquiry involves the researcher, or than a technical making process completed according to 
a predefined specification involves the craftsman. All of which suggests, in line with Carr’s 
(1999) argument, that phronesis is a useful way of characterising choreographic as well as 
moral knowledge.  
 
The concept of phronesis seems relevant to choreography not only because we can draw an 
analogy between dance-making and moral action. Choreography is itself arguably a form of 
praxis because it involves collective production. Choreographers work with others – 
performers, designers, audiences – to produce performance events. It is crucial, in this 
intersubjective context, to have a creative sensitivity to the others involved, the evolving 
situation and the experiences it generates. This creative sensitivity – and the ability to act in 
accordance with what it suggests to be the ‘right’ course – is arguably a fundamental part of 
any performing artist’s practice. Decisions are not generally made according to a technically 
rational view of how to manipulate the relationships central to dance-making, but rather 
arise out of the circumstances of the moment and are governed by a different kind of 
rationality sensitive to contingencies and to the evolving nature of those relationships. 
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Perhaps this is particularly true of choreography-as-research which tends to involve an 
increased self-consciousness about how the artist conducts herself within the making 
process. Research provides a space for reflection, often not afforded in the sphere of 
professional performance, geared as it is towards the production of works that can be 
exchanged as commodities within the dance market. With such reflection may come a 
heightened awareness of oneself and one’s encounters as an artist as the basis of any 
performance event. And this awareness is arguably a form of phronetic insight developed 





This discussion has sought to show how philosophical ideas about practical knowledge, 
reasoning and wisdom might be relevant to choreography and dance practice as research, 
helping us identify (at least part of) their epistemological value. This is not the only way in 
which the knowledge developed in and through dance-making can be described, and it is not 
unproblematic.11 For example, one might question whether theoretical and practical 
knowledge can be so sharply differentiated, whether techne and phronesis are distinct and 
mutually exclusive forms of practical knowledge and also whether the particularism of 
phronetic insight compromises its shareability and hence its very status as knowledge. All of 
these issues and more warrant more detailed investigation. But, hopefully, the discussion 
does demonstrate the fruitfulness of the literature for attempts to think through the 
epistemology of choreography. To think of choreography and choreographic research as 
dealing in practical knowledge does help move us beyond dominant paradigms, which deny 





1 See Nelson (2013) for an overview of the development and stakes of Practice as Research. 
Allegue et al. (2009) also examines the historical emergence of PAR in the UK context, and 
critically explores the range of issues raised by its integration into the Academy. This volume 
emerged out of the PARIP (Practice as Research in Performance) project, an AHRB-funded 
initiative, which investigated (from 2001 to 2005) the creative and academic issues raised by 
practice as research in theatre, dance, film, video and television. The project’s website is still 
live (http://www.bristol.ac.uk/parip/index.htm) and presents an interesting and useful 
picture of the nature of PAR debates over a decade ago. See also Pakes (2003), Piccini (2003) 
and Thomson (2002). 
  
2 Inductive reasoning and inference to best explanation are also widely used patterns of 
inference, based on a logic of probability rather than truth and falsity. Popper (1968) 
proposes to refocus scientific reasoning around the principle of falsifiability rather than 
verification, recasting all inference in its deductive – and hence more reliable – form. 
According to Hempel’s ‘covering law model’, meanwhile, the logic of scientific explanation is 
essentially deductive, since, when trying to explain the occurrence of a particular 
phenomenon, scientists tend to cite a general law from which the empirical facts follow 
(Hempel 1965).  
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3  Good examples are Rosemary Butcher’s reflections on her making processes (Butcher and 
Melrose 2005: especially 66–85) and Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker’s accounts of numerous 
early works (in Cvejic and De Keersmaeker 2012, 2013 and 2014).  
 
4 The necessity (or otherwise) of written documents accompanying practice-as-research is a 
contentious issue within the performing arts research community. See Reason (2006), Piccini 
and Rye (2009) and Nelson (2013, 71-92) for discussion. Mullin (2011) and Macleod and 
Holdridge (2011) explore the issues in a wider context that includes fine art. 
 
5 These are the kinds of issues an examiner might consider when assessing a choreographic 
research project, but also typical questions posed in reviews and critical analyses of 
choreographers’ work. See, for example, the essays in Bremser and Sanders (2011). Reason 
(2006, 183-204) examines what is at stake in the reviewing of performance.  
 
6 On dance as a rule-governed activity, see McFee (1992: 52–5) and Carr (1987b).  
 
7 See Pakes (2003). Gaut and Livingston (2003) offer a critical overview of philosophical 
issues and literature on creativity, relevant to this and other related themes.  
 
8 See, for example, UKCGE (1997). Pakes (2003) explores further the issue of originality in 
dance practice-as-research.  
 
9 The Choreography and Cognition Project, led by Scott deLahunta and Wayne McGregor, 
for example, was a collaborative project in which an artist (McGregor) sought to inform his 
creative practice through exploring cognitive scientific research on creativity: see deLahunta, 
Barnard and McGregor (2009) for an account of the project and the issues it raised. One 
interesting feature of this research is its staging of an encounter between two very different 
modes of knowledge. See also Jola (2010).  
 
10 Merce Cunningham’s use of chance methods, for example, famously aimed to distance 
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